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Attorney Malpractice: Use of Contract Analysis to
Determine the Existence of an Attorney-Client
Relationship
Joan Togstad's husband was paralyzed while undergoing hospi-
tal treatment for a cerebral aneurysm.' Togstad, believing that there
was a possible malpractice cause of action against the attending phy-
sician, consulted attorney Jerre Miller. In an interview at Miller's
office,' Miller questioned Togstad and took notes while she related
the circumstances leading to her husband's paralysis. At the close of
the interview, Miller told Togstad that it was his opinion that the
facts were insufficient to support a malpractice action against her
husband's physician.3 Nevertheless, because Miller was inexperi-
enced in the medical malpractice area,4 he told Togstad that he
would consult an expert medical malpractice attorney and contact
her if the attorney's opinion was different from his own.5 When Miller
did not contact Togstad, she assumed that he would not be represent-
ing her and that his opinion on the merits of the claim was correct.6
Ten months later, Togstad learned that there was a strong likeli-
hood that Miller's advice was erroneous. By this time, however, the
two-year statute of limitations for bringing medical malpractice ac-
tions against physicians7 had expired.' As a result, the Togstads
brought a legal malpractice action against Miller to recover any dam-
1. A clamp had been left on one of John Togstad's arteries for an extended period
of time without proper adjustment; as a result, he suffered paralysis and severe impedi-
ment to his speech and writing. Transcript of Proceedings at 117, Togstad v. Vesely,
Otto, Miller & Keefe, No. 722846 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., Sept. 26, 1978)
(Order) [hereinafter cited as Transcript].
2. The interview lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Id. at 46.
3. Id. at 42, 46, 53. Miller gave his opinion without examining medical records
or researching the legal issue. Id. at 134. He also failed to disclose to Togstad that there
was a short statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. Id. at 137. Miller
testified that "[tihe only thing I told her . . . was that there was nothing related in
her factual circumstances that told me that she had a case that our firm would be
interested in undertaking." Id. at 120.
4. Prior to his interview with Togstad, Miller had never represented a client in
a medical malpractice action. Id. at 133.
5. At trial, both parties testified that Miller had stated that he would confer with
another attorney, and if he did not contact Togstad, she was to assume his opinion
was correct. Togstad assumed Miller would contact one of his associates. Id. at 42, 53,
121.
6. Approximately one week after the interview at Miller's office, Togstad came
to the conclusion that defendant would not be representing her husband's claim. Id.
at 53, 54, 69.
7. See MINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1978).
8. Transcript, supra note 1, at 54.
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ages that would have been awarded in a suit against Togstad's doc-
tor.' Miller defended on the ground that an attorney-client relation-
ship was not created by his discussion with Togstad. The jury found
that an attorney-client relationship had existed and returned a ver-
dict for the Togstads. The district judge denied Miller's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict,10 ruling that there was suffi-
cient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that an attorney-
client relationship had existed. Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller &
Keefe, No. 722846 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., Sept. 26, 1978)."
The attorney malpractice action is intended to compensate those
who suffer loss' 2 due to an attorney's negligence, as well as to give
attorneys an incentive to exercise their professional responsibilities
with care.'" Courts disagree on the underlying theory of the attorney
malpractice action." Some view it as a contract action that arises
from the attorney's breach of an implied promise to use a reasonable
degree of skill and care in the exercise of his professional duties."
9. Defendants' Memorandum for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in
the Alternative, for a New Trial at 3-10, Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, No.
722846 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., Sept. 26, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Memo-
randum].
10. Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Ver-
dict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial, Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe,
No. 722846 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., Sept. 26, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Order]. In addition to the attorney-client relationship issue, the defendant on motion
argued that: (1) plaintiff must show not only that the attorney was liable but that any
judgment against John Togstad's physician would have been collectible; (2) the court
committed error in failing to tell the jury that damages should have been reduced by
the contingent fee payable to the attorney if the first action was successful; and (3)
the court failed to give the curative instruction requested by defendants to the jury.
Id. at 6-9; Memorandum, supra note 9, at 10-13.
11. The jury awarded damages in excess of $600,000 to the Togstads. Togstad v.
Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, No. 722846 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., Sept. 26,
1978). The judge ruled against the defendant on the other issues as well. Id.
12. In order to prevail in an attorney malpractice action such as Togstad, it is
necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he would have recovered damages in the
original suit that the defendant-attorney's negligence prevented him from bringing.
See generally Ronnigen v. Hertogs, 294 Minn. 7, 9, 199 N.W.2d 420,421 (1972); Christy
v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293-94 (1970); Coggin, Attorney
Negligence. . .A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225, 233-38 (1958). Although
of relatively recent origin, attorney malpractice actions are recognized in every Ameri-
can jurisdiction. See Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292, 1292 (1963)
(citing Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19
BROOKLYN L. REv. 233, 236 (1953)). It has been estimated that in the last decade the
total number of legal malpractice suits has doubled. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1977,
at 44, col. 6.
13. See Note, supra note 12, at 1292 and authorities cited.
14. Id.
15. See Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 756
& n.11 (1959); Note, supra note 12, at 1292-93.
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Others view it as a tort action that results from the attorney's breach
of the duty to use due care created by the attorney-client relation-
ship.'6 Under either theory, the plaintiff must establish certain ele-
ments in order to recover. These elements are: (1) that an attorney-
client relationship existed;1" (2) that the defendant committed acts
constituting negligence or breach of contract; (3) that the plaintiff
was damaged; and (4) that the acts of the attorney were the factual
and proximate cause of the damage.'"
In determining whether an attorney-client relationship exists,
courts have often used a contract analysis regardless of whether the
plaintiff's suit was in contract or tort.'" Under contract principles, an
attorney-client relationship clearly exists when the attorney expressly
agrees to represent the client.20 Most jurisdictions also recognize that
an attorney-client relationship is present when the conduct of the
parties gives rise to an implied contract. 2' For example, even though
16. See Note, supra note 12, at 1293. For a discussion of the differences between
contract and tort actions, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 (4th
ed. 1971).
17. An attorney-client relationship is the primary requirement for a legal mal-
practice action. See, e.g., Ronnigen v. Hertogs, 294 Minn. 7, 9, 199 N.W.2d 420, 421
(1972).
18. See Eckert v. Schaal, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 58 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819-20 (1967)
(overruled on other grounds in Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6
Cal. 3d 176, 190 n.29, 491 P.2d 421, 430 n.29, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846 n.29 (1971)); Christy
v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293-94 (1970). These elements are
identical to those required in other professional malpractice actions. See, e.g., Crosby
v. Grandview Nursing Home, 290 A.2d 375, 380 (Me. 1972) (physicians); Vernon J.
Rockler & Co. v. Glickman, Isenberg, Lurie & Co., 273 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. 1978)
(accountants).
19. When the action is one in negligence, the attorney has no duty to the plaintiff
unless there is an attorney-client relationship. According to most courts, the relation-
ship is created by contract; the question of its existence, therefore, has traditionally
been resolved through use of contract principles. See Wade, supra note 15, at 756.
20. For an example of an express contract, see Sitton v. Clements, 385 F.2d 869,
870 (6th Cir. 1967) (defendant attorney wrote on a letter requesting his services: "I
hereby accept employment on the above terms."). Some courts will find that an
attorney-client relationship exists only when there is an express contract:
The legal relationship of attorney and client is purely contractual and results
only from the mutual agreement. . . of the parties. . . .Such relationship
is based only upon the clear and express agreement of the parties as to the
nature of the work to be undertaken by the attorney and the compensation
which the client agrees to pay . ...
Delta Equip. & Constr. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 186 So. 2d 454, 458 (La. App. 1966);
see Board of Comm'rs v. Jones, 291 Ala. 371, 377, 281 So. 2d 267, 273 (1973) ("In order
to create an attorney-client relationship, we hold that there must be a contract of
employment, the same as in other cases of contract.").
21. The contract arises from the conduct of the parties and is often referred to
as "implied-in-fact." See A. CoRBN, COaBI ON CoNTRACTs § 18 (1 vol. ed. 1952).
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the attorney does not expressly accept a person as a client, if the
attorney has undertaken any efforts on the person's behalf or if any
fee has been paid, an attorney-client relationship has commonly been
held to exist under principles of implied contract.22 Although courts
in some recent cases have not referred to contract principles in deter-
mining whether an attorney-client relationship was present,2 most
courts continue to require a contractual relationship between the
parties in malpractice actions.24
The first Minnesota case to consider the question of when an
attorney-client relationship exists was Ryan v. Long. In Ryan, the
plaintiff consulted the defendant attorney on a legal matter and the
attorney gave him his professional opinion. Although the court found
that there was an attorney-client relationship, it did not indicate
whether its conclusion was based on contract principles or a tort
theory.26
In more recent decisions, however, the Minnesota Supreme
Court appears to have determined whether an attorney-client rela-
tionship existed by using a contractual analysis. In Christy v.
Saliterman,2 the plaintiff brought an action against an attorney for
Neither contractual formality, compensation, nor expectation of compensation is re-
quired for an implied-in-fact contract. See Shoup v. Dowsey, 134 N.J. Eq. 440, 475-
76, 36 A.2d 66, 85 (1944). But cf. McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D.S.D.
1968) (defendant attorney's silence in response to plaintiffs request for his services
insufficient to create the necessary implied contract).
22. See, e.g., Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150-51, 179 N.W.2d 288, 294
(1970).
23. See, e.g., Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 (D.N.J. 1975) ("the law
of New Jersey imposes the duties incident to such a[n attorney-client] relationship
on one who merely 'assumes to give legal advice and counsel') (quoting Shoup v.
Dowsey, 134 N.J. Eq. 440, 475-76, 36 A.2d 66, 85 (1944)); Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260
N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977) ("The relationship is created when (1) a person seeks advice
or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance sought pertains to matters
within the attorney's professional competence, and (3) the attorney ... agrees to give
or actually gives the desired advice. . . .") (emphasis added). See also In re Palmieri,
76 N.J. 51, 57, 385 A.2d 856, 860 (1978); In re Makowski, 73 N.J. 265, 269, 374 A.2d
458, 460 (1977).
24. See Wade, supra note 15, at 756.
25. 35 Minn. 394, 29 N.W. 51 (1886).
26. The Ryan court stated,
[I]t sufficiently appears that plaintiff, for himself, called upon defendant,
as an attorney-at-law, for "legal advice," and that defendant assumed to give
him a professional opinion in reference to the matter as to which plaintiff
consulted him. Upon this state of facts the defendant must be taken to have
acted as plaintiff's legal adviser, at plaintiff's request, and so as to establish
between them the relation of attorney and client.
Id. at 394, 29 N.W. at 51.
27. 288 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1970).
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failing to file a medical malpractice suit within the statute of limita-
tions. Although the court recognized that an attorney malpractice
action can be brought under either negligence or contract theories,2
in affirming the jury's finding of an attorney-client relationship the
court stated: "We think that the record . . . amply supports the
finding. . . that a contract for professional services was entered into
... . "21 That the court viewed the issue in contractual terms is also
evidenced by the opinion's reference to "the retainer agreement" be-
tween the parties as further support for the jury's finding. .
In Ronnigen v. Hertogs,31 the Minnesota Supreme Court again
resolved the issue of the existence of an attorney-client relationship
by use of contract principles. The plaintiff in Ronnigen claimed that
he retained the defendant as his attorney and that the defendant
failed to prosecute a tort claim. In upholding a directed verdict for
the defendant, the court concluded that "[u]nder the fundamental
rules applicable to contracts of employment. . . the evidence would
not sustain a finding that defendant either expressly or impliedly
promised or agreed to represent plaintiff .... ,,32
In Togstad, the district court also addressed the question of
attorney-client relationship in contractual terms. In approving the
jury's finding that an attorney-client relationship existed between
Miller and Togstad, the judge, noting that Togstad requested legal
advice and that Miller assented and gave his legal opinion,3 reasoned
that "[w]hen the attorney gives advice . . . [to] the person in his
office in regards to a legal matter, an attorney-client contractual
relationship arises." Moreover, the judge noted that Togstad's fail-
ure to sign a retainer was of "little significance," and stated that the
28. Id. at 150, 179 N.W.2d at 294 ("Once it has been established that the rela-
tionship of attorney and client exists and that plaintiff has sustained damages by
reason of the attorney's negligence or breach of contract, the right to recover is estab-
lished.").
29. Id. Defendant attorney had obtained authorization to examine plaintiffs
medical records. Moreover, when plaintiff and his wife asked defendant how the medi-
cal malpractice case was progressing, he assured them that "it's all been taken care
of." Id. at 150-51, 179 N.W.2d at 294.
30. Id. at 150, 179 N.W.2d at 294.
31. 294 Minn. 7, 199 N.W.2d 420 (1972).
32. Id. at 11, 199 N.W.2d at 422. In the course of representing his client's claim,
the attorney had an incidental discussion with the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended
that as a result of this discussion an attorney-client relationship was created. Id. at 9-
10, 199 N.W.2d at 422. The court held that the plaintiff proved "no more than an
expectation to employ defendant." Id. at 10, 199 N.W.2d at 422.
33. Order, supra note 10, at 4.
34. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). In support of this proposition the judge cited
Ryan. Id. Ryan, however, did not hold that the attorney-client relationship was a
contractual one. See note 26 supra.
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fact that Miller did not receive a fee had no bearing on whether an
attorney-client relationship existed between the parties., Considera-
tion and the other formal elements of contract are not necessary to
create an attorney-client relationship, the judge concluded, because
the attorney-client contractual relationship is a "special type of con-
tract which cannot be categorically defined, but must be determined
on a case by case basis."3
The district judge in Togstad apparently thought that there
could be no attorney-client relationship between Miller and Togstad
unless the two parties had agreed on some type of contract. This view
no doubt resulted from the emphasis that the Minnesota Supreme
Court had placed on the contractual nature of the attorney-client
relationship in Christy and Ronnigen.37 But the judge in Togstad was
forced to depart from a conventional contract analysis in order to find
the requisite relationship between Miller and Togstad. As the opinion
itself suggests, no contract existed under traditional principles of
contract law, because the elements of offer, acceptance, and consider-
ation were absent.'3
Furthermore, the judge's contention that a "special kind of con-
tract"39 nonetheless existed between the parties is questionable. Even
if the element of consideration were ignored, the basic contract re-
quirement that there be an express or implied promise" between the
parties was not satisfied in this case." Miller did not agree to repre-
sent Togstad, nor did he take any action indicating his intention to
do so.42 Because it is virtually impossible to infer a promise on the
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 2.
37. See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text.
38. Order, supra note 10, at 3 ("Since a contract between an attorney and his
client is a special type of contract [it] may be found on the basis of a variety of factors
39. Id. at 2.
40. See A.ConmN, supra note 21, § 1, at 2 ("That portion of the field of law that
is classified and described as the law of contracts attempts the realization of reasonable
expectations that have been induced by the making of a promise.").
41. See Ronnigen v. Hertogs, 294 Minn. 7, 11, 199 N.W.2d 420, 422 (1972). The
literal language of Ronnigen, see text accompanying note 32 supra, seems to indicate
that the court would find no attorney-client relationship unless the attorney specifi-
cally agreed to represent the plaintiff.
42. It is clear from the testimony at trial that Togstad knew that Miller would
not be representing her claim. See note 6 supra. Miller's statement that he would
contact Togstad after conferring with another attorney on the matter is the only aspect
of the interview between the parties that could be characterized as a promise and could
arguably be used to establish a contractual attorney-client relationship. See note 5
supra. Nevertheless, the judge based his ruling principally on the fact that a contract
was created when Miller offered advice.
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part of Miller, the finding that an offer and acceptance took place
when Togstad requested and received a legal opinion from Miller43
strains the contract model beyond its logical limits."
The foregoing analysis suggests that if the contract test enunci-
ated in Christy and Ronnigen had been literally applied in Togstad,
the judge would have been unable to find that an attorney-client
relationship existed between Miller and Togstad. Such a result, how-
ever, would be undesirable from a policy standpoint. Miller negli-
gently gave incorrect legal advice, 5 and Togstad reasonably relied on
it to her detriment. If a lawyer could avoid liability in such a situation
by claiming that there was no contract between the plaintiff and
himself, the policies underlying attorney malpractice actions" would
be frustrated. There would be no incentive for lawyers who have not
been formally retained to refrain from negligently giving legal advice,
and parties harmed by such negligent advice would be uncompen-
sated.
Cases such as Togstad demonstrate a basic dilemma faced by
courts attempting to define the appropriate scope of attorney liability
without rejecting the contract analysis for determining the existence
of an attorney-client relationship. The contract test leads to equitable
results in cases like Christy, where the lawyer's actions clearly indi-
cate that he has undertaken the representation of a client.,7 It also
operates satisfactorily in cases like Ronnigen, where it is clear that
the lawyer has not given legal advice to the plaintiff, much less been
retained by him." In a case such as Togstad, however, where a lawyer
43. See Order, supra note 10, at 4.
44. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would not operate to create a contract
between Miller and Togstad. This doctrine holds that "[a] promise which the promi-
sor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substan-
tial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbear-
ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONraCtS § 90 (1932). In order to invoke this doctrine
there must be an antecedent promise, and Miller made no promise to represent Togs-
tad.
For the same reason, there was no implied contract between Miller and Togstad.
Like promissory estoppel, an implied-in-fact contract requires a promise, but the
promise is inferred from the conduct of the parties. See note 19 supra.
45. See notes 49-53 infra and accompanying text.
46. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
47. In Christy, the jury found that there was a retainer agreement. Thus, even
under the narrowest application of the contract test it was proper to find an attorney-
client relationship. 288 Minn. at 150, 179 N.W.2d at 294.
48. In Ronnigen, the plaintiff had only an expectation to retain the attorney who
neither gave legal advice nor took any action indicating his intention to represent the
plaintiff. Even under the broadest application of the contract test, an attorney-client
relationship was not created. 294 Minn. at 10, 199 N.W.2d at 422 (1972).
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has given a professional opinion but there is no reasonable basis for
inferring that any type of agreement existed between the parties, the
concept of contract must be severely distorted in order to find an
attorney-client contractual relationship.
If the contract on which an attorney-client relationship is predi-
cated is often nothing more than a fiction, the contract approach to
this problem should be abandoned unless it serves some useful ana-
lytical purpose. The contract approach is not a useful analytical tool
for determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship be-
cause a lawyer's duty to exercise reasonable care in giving profes-
sional advice frequently does not arise from contract, but from the
position the lawyer occupies as an expert in legal matters. Because
of his assumed expertise, the lawyer is in a unique position to cause
harm if he gives erroneous legal advice to a person who has consulted
him. Under general principles of tort law, the lawyer has a duty not
to act negligently when others may be injured by his negligence. 9
When his advice is sought, the lawyer is not unlike the driver of a car
who is under a duty not to create an unreasonable risk of harm to
others by driving negligently. Like the driver, the lawyer's duty does
not arise from a contract, but from the traditional tort principle that
a duty of care is created whenever a person engages in conduct that
may create an unreasonable risk of harm to others."
This analysis suggests that the existence of an attorney-client
relationship should be determined by tort rather than contract prin-
ciples. Whenever a lawyer gives legal advice, he is in a position to
create an unreasonable risk of harm due to the negligent exercise of
his professional skills. There is a strong likelihood that the advice will
be relied on by a layman even if it is erroneous. The court has indi-
cated that an attorney malpractice action may be brought for breach
of an implied contract to exercise reasonable skill in performing pro-
fessional duties,' but it would be desirable to drop this fiction and
recognize that the attorney malpractice action is in fact a negligence
action. An important step in this direction would be to adopt a test
for the attorney-client relationship based on the notion that the exist-
ence of that relationship is fundamentally a question of whether a
49. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at § 53.
50. The lawyer who offers gratuitous advice is in a position analogous to the
physician who witnesses a traffic accident. The law does not impose a duty on physi-
cians to treat a victim of the accident. Should the physician undertake to treat a
victim, however, he will be liable if he does so negligently. See id. § 56, at 340-48.
Similarly, if a lawyer voluntarily offers legal advice to an individual, an attorney-client
relationship should be deemed to be established and he should be liable if his negli-
gence causes harm to the individual.
51. See note 28 supra.
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lawyer has assumed a duty toward a person by offering legal advice.
Such a test might be formulated as follows: An attorney-client rela-
tionship is created whenever an individual seeks and receives legal
advice from an attorney in circumstances in which a reasonable per-
son would rely on such advice.2
The application of this test would have important advantages
over the contract analysis currently employed by Minnesota courts.
First, since it is more consistent with the view that an attorney mal-
practice action is an action in tort, not contract, use of this test would
help achieve doctrinal consistency. Second, and more important, the
proposed test would require the finding of an attorney-client relation-
ship in those situations in which both policy and fairness dictate that
lawyers be held accountable for their acts of negligence.5 3
The test would help define the appropriate scope of liability in
attorney malpractice actions. On the one hand, the scope of the lia-
bility imposed would not be too broad. The proposed test imposes no
affirmative duty on lawyers to offer legal advice to all individuals who
seek it, and the lawyer would remain free to choose his own clients
by refusing to give legal advice to a party who requests it. Moreover,
an attorney could give his view of a particular legal issue without
subjecting himself to potential liability if it is not reasonable for the
person seeking the advice to rely on it. In other words, the offering of
a legal opinion would have to be given in an atmosphere of sufficient
formality to justify an expectation that the advice is reliable. Thus,
an attorney's opinion given to a friend at a cocktail party with the
warning that the advice is largely uninformed should probably not
give rise to an attorney-client relationship.54
On the other hand, the scope of the liability imposed by the
suggested test would not be as narrow as that resulting from applica-
tion of traditional contract principles. The test would quite clearly
52. For a similar formulation, see Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in
New York for Negligence, 19 BROOKLYN L. REV. 233, 243 ("The test in these cases
should be whether the attorney has held himself out as one who is applying his profes-
sional skill to help the other party."). See also M. CLARK & C. WOLFRAM, PROFESSIONAL
REsPONsmirrY: ISSUES FOR MINNESOTA ATrORNEYs 154 (Minnesota Continuing Legal
Education 1976) ("[T]he existence of the attorney-client relationship for legal mal-
practice purposes will be found . . . where the consultation . . . has been conducted
in a serious and formal manner and the attorney is shown to have spoken definitively
on the legal question.").
53. The proposed analysis may create an expanded scope of liability. The conse-
quences, however, will not be harmful to the profession. It is both a desirable and
attainable goal to make attorneys more cautious and circumspect when offering advice
to those who seek it.
54. Under these circumstances, the attorney's disclaimers operate to make it
unreasonable for the friend described to place reliance on the statements.
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result in the determination that an attorney-client relationship ex-
isted in Togstad, since the legal advice was given at Miller's law
offices under circumstances in which it was reasonable for Togstad
to rely on it. Instead of requiring a court to engage in the kind of
unconvincing contract analysis used in Togstad, the test proposed
here would allow courts faced with similar cases to find the existence
of an attorney-client relationship by focusing on the duty imposed on
a lawyer when he gives legal advice.
The contract analysis traditionally employed by courts for deter-
mining the existence of an attorney-client relationship was justified
on the ground that no lawyer should be held to a professional stan-
dard of care unless it is clear that he had agreed to represent a pro-
spective client." This view was arguably incorrect from its very incep-
tion, because it tended to insulate a lawyer from liability even in
situations in which it could be expected that a layman might be
harmed by negligent legal advice." Moreover, the original policy
objective is no longer served with the advent of cases like Togstad
which purport to apply a contract analysis even though there had
been no agreement between the attorney and the plaintiff. These
considerations, combined with the advantages of the alternative
analysis recommended by this Comment, argue in favor of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court abandoning the contract approach for deter-
mining the existence of an attorney-client relationship and deciding
such cases on the basis of tort principles.
55. See Wade, supra note 15, at 756.
56. See Note, supra note 12, at 1312.
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